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Over the past several decades, the number of sites, objects, and prac-
tices that have been deemed heritage has increased dramatically across 
the globe and, likewise, the number of heritage studies. Western-
language studies of Japanese heritage have focused on questions of 
identity, power, the state, and tourism. These questions must be 
understood in terms of heritagization’s transnational nature. Based on 
Western-lanugage, primarily English, studies, this review examines 
recent research on Japanese heritage. Much research has focused on 
museums and castles, but “intangible heritage” and “negative heritage” 
are also important. Heritage studies is not a coherent research field. 
Informed by anthropology, history, geography, art history, literary 
studies, and other disciplines, heritage studies probes what lies behind 
cultural expressions and illuminates power relations.
Keywords:  heritage studies, public memory, tourism, identity, 
Japanese history
Over the past several decades, the number of sites, objects, and practices that have 
been deemed heritage has increased dramatically across the globe and, likewise, the 
number of heritage studies. Heritage studies is a field of research that has developed 
from older disciplines: anthropology, geography, sociology, and history, as well as 
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built environment, landscape, and leisure and tourism studies. This is not to mention 
the fields of art history and conservation, museum studies, historiography and mem-
ory, literature, theatre, folklore, religion, and even international relations. Although 
heritage studies has its own journals, associations, and university programs, it is 
doubtful whether it is a coherent field with even roughly agreed-upon basic methodol-
ogies, questions, and intellectual genealogy. True, its division between theoretical work 
(academic) and practical work (professional) is typical of many academic fields, and 
heritage studies does a better job than most of bringing together theory and practice. 
And true, heritage studies may be well positioned to evolve as an interdisciplinary field 
at the intersection of traditional disciplines (just as Asian studies has). Nonetheless, its 
object of research—heritage—is decidedly amorphous and increasingly so.
 In the nineteenth century, heritage preservation generally focused on objects and 
architecture deemed to have a particular aesthetic or historic value. These aesthetic 
and historical categories were shaped largely by elite men who associated them with 
national or imperial glory and identity and hoped “heritage” would help civilize and 
discipline non-elite peoples. As the twentieth century unfolded, however, the scope of 
heritage expanded to localities, subordinate groups and classes, and indigenous peo-
ples—and also to entire built environments (such as villages and urban districts), 
landscapes small and large (a rock, mountain ranges, fields, vast sections of the 
oceans) and to traditional crafts, practices, and rituals. The rise of such “intangible 
heritage” in the second half of the twentieth century potentially leaves nothing out. 
Everything has the potential to become heritage.
 The question “whose heritage?” is always up for debate, and the question “who 
decides?” is even more prickly. Heritage is the subject of numerous legal regimes, each 
with its own standards for granting official heritage status. Individual nations and the 
United Nations (through the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural 
Organization, or UNESCO) do so, as do local regimes. However, “heritage” has two 
broader senses. First, heritage is whatever can be conceived as heritage, with or with-
out official status. For example, Shinto shrines in Japan, while sometimes protected in 
certain ways, by and large have no official heritage status; but they are, in some cases, 
seen as similar to Buddhist temples that do have official heritage status. 1 Second, 
1  Some Shinto shrines are incorporated into larger heritage complexes; for example, recognized 
Buddhist temple grounds or the UNESCO World Heritage site “Sacred Sites and Pilgrimage 
Routes in the Kii Mountain Range” on the Kii Peninsula.
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“heritage” is often used in a metaphorical sense to describe collective memory and 
tradition.
 Studies of heritage in Japan revolve around the major issues found in most other 
works on heritage. (This may indicate a greater coherency to the field of heritage 
studies than I suggested above.) While there is little agreement among scholars of 
heritage on what constitutes heritage—most seem willing to grant that heritage is 
anything that anybody deems as heritage—scholars do generally agree that it is a 
modern phenomenon. 2 Certain kinds of heritage work certainly existed before the 
modern era—ranging from the collection of artifacts and curiosities to the transgen-
erational property of families or clans (heritage as inheritance). But the generalized 
sense of group identification with the past as mediated or prompted by objects, 
practices, and landscapes of memory can scarcely be found before the late eighteenth 
century. The central questions of heritage studies include the following: Whose heri-
tage are we talking about—that is, who is constructing heritage for what purposes, 
and who may be challenging the “authorized heritage discourse”? 3 What is the state’s 
role in promoting (or suppressing) heritage—and to what extent is the process of 
heritigization best conceived as top-down, bottom-up, or some combination of the 
two? Should scholars focus on deconstructing heritage as a form of mythmaking 
categorically distinct from history writing (whatever history’s own mythical proper-
ties), or should they emphasize the social functions and perhaps deeper truths of 
heritage? 4 How do people live with heritage—benefiting or suffering from it spiritu-
ally, socially, politically, and economically? A final theoretical and methodological 
question cannot yet be answered, if it ever will be: given that each individual case of 
2  That is, the self-conscious conflation of heritage and identity, closely related to the rise of the 
modern nation-state and the losses associated with industrialization and population increases, but 
perhaps more profoundly found in the post-Enlightenment sense that we are in some sense our 
past, mark heritage as a modern phenomenon. See inter alia David Lowenthal, “Identity, 
Heritage, and History,” in John R. Gillis, ed., The Politics of National Identity, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1994, pp. 41–57. For claims that a concept of heritage is temporally 
deeper, and indeed universal, see David C. Harvey, “Heritage Pasts and Heritage Presents: 
Temporality, Meaning and the Scope of Heritage Studies,” International Journal of Heritage 
Studies vol. 7, no. 4, 2001, pp. 319–338. However, in my view, while it is true that all societies 
situate themselves vis-à-vis the past in some way, if we treat heritage as something more than 
memory-stories and traditional practices, it is a distinctively modern phenomenon.
3  Laurajane Smith, Uses of Heritage, London: Routledge, 2010.
4  Christoph Brumann, “Heritage Agnosticism: A Third Path for the Study of Cultural Heritage,” 
Social Anthropology/Anthropologie Sociale vol. 22, no. 2, 2014, pp. 173–188.
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heritigization will answer the questions above in a unique way, how can we reach 
useful conclusions about heritage in larger settings (such as Japan), and should we 
even try? “Heritage” in the sense these questions raise is, outside of Europe, a trans-
lated term. In Japan, then, heritage is not only an aspect of modernity but also, in a 
sense, an imported one. This essay discusses the following English-language mono-
graphs, as well as selected articles in English and French, in order to consider these 
questions.
Alice Y. Tseng, The Imperial Museums of Meiji Japan: Architecture and the Art of 
the Nation, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2008.
Noriko Aso, Public Properties: Museums in Imperial Japan, Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2014.
Hyung Il Pai, Heritage Management in Korea and Japan: The Politics of Antiquity 
and Identity, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2013.
Oleg Benesch and Ran Zwigenberg, Japan’s Castles: Citadels of Modernity in War 
and Peace, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019.
Tze May Loo, Heritage Politics: Shuri Castle and Okinawa’s Incorporation into 
Modern Japan, 1879–2000, Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2014.
Natsuko Akagawa, Heritage Conservation in Japan’s Cultural Diplomacy: 
Heritage, National Identity and National Interest, London: Routledge, 
2015.
While I cannot here pursue comparative questions, it may be that heritigization in 
Japan is distinguished, first, by the state’s dominant role from the 1870s to 1945, even 
while Japanese heritage was subject to contestation (as heritage always is). Second, 
heritage in postwar Japan may have been especially contested because of conflicting 
views of the Pacific War and questions of war guilt. Today, Japan is a major power in 
what might be called the global heritage competition for tourist dollars, and it has 
shaped the global heritage regime. In particular, Japanese diplomacy is largely 
responsible for the centrality of “intangible heritage” in UNESCO designations. 
Heritage, however, continues to refer both to informal or unofficial heritage practices 
and to officially designated heritage at the level of states and localities as much as to 
the coveted World Heritage status bestowed by UNESCO. Much Western-language 
scholarship focuses on what might be called heritage problems. First, how top-down 
heritigization suppresses marginal voices, but equally how those voices nonetheless 
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challenge official heritage and sometimes produce their own. And second, how the 
business of heritage tourism provides economic benefits for some but harms the 
quality of life for others and even risks destroying the heritage it is ostensibly designed 
to preserve.
Making Heritage, Museums, and Colonial Spaces
After coming to power in 1868, the new Meiji government moved with astonishing 
speed in passing legislation to protect antiquities. As extensive historical scholarship 
recounts, early missions to Western countries during the late Tokugawa had already 
noted the importance of national museums in Europe and the United States. Meiji 
authorities had also become worried about Westerners in Japan buying and exporting 
artworks. Such artworks symbolized Japan’s high culture, even if their value in this 
sense was first suggested by foreign interest in them. Japan’s first Plan for the 
Protection of Antiquities of 1871 (Koki Kyūbutsu Hozonkata) was designed to pre-
serve and prevent the export of thirty-one movable objects. Such legislation was 
among the first of its type in the world, preceding Britain’s Ancient Monuments 
Protection Act of 1882. The legislation was passed on the eve of rapid Westernization 
and at a time when Buddhism was under attack and much of the heritage of the 
Tokugawa was dismissed as useless “feudal” detritus. (Daimyo castles, today central to 
Japanese heritage, were either abandoned or turned into military garrisons, for 
example.) 5 A concern with antiquities at this time thus seems incongruous, as most 
people seemed to be looking firmly to the future, not the past. But the Meiji govern-
ment is not unique in its efforts to preserve aspects of the past, even or especially at 
the price of ossifying such those aspects, and just as it awakened to their disappear-
ance. 6 This seeming incongruity aside, Meiji policies to protect aspects of the past, 
even amid tumultuous change and disdain for the past, may have contributed to the 
later essentialized conception of Japan as uniquely able to assimilate foreign cultures 
5  Oleg Benesch, “Castles and the Militarisation of Urban Society in Imperial Japan,” Transactions 
of the Royal Historical Society vol. 28, 2018, pp. 107–134; see also Benesch and Zwigenberg, 
Japan’s Castles, chap. 3.
6  Another case is that of late Qing China, where elites, alarmed by the loss of artworks abroad, 
began to agitate for preservation laws and the construction of museums. See Peter Zarrow, “Notes 
on Heritage and Memory in Modern China,” Monumenta Serica: Journal of Oriental Studies 
(forthcoming).
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while remaining indisputably Japanese. 7 Modern Japanese heritage thus emerged well 
before the mid-Meiji conservative reaction against Westernization. Yet in its headlong 
rush to industrialize the economy and centralize the polity, the Meiji government, 
while constructing an emperor-centered and Shintoized past, disdained actual 
Tokugawa heritage and often sought to suppress local traditions. Thus such heritage 
as practiced in the early Meiji did not stem primarily from a sense of loss or even the 
need to provide elements of stability in a turbulent time, but was rather a pragmatic 
response to the foreign threat.
 Artworks, whether or not a matter of national pride, were certainly a tool of late 
nineteenth-century international diplomacy. The Meiji government sent objects 
abroad, participating in world fairs to show Japanese art and culture to foreigners who 
would not be visiting Japan. From today’s vantage, one can see the roots of a sense of 
heritage in the dialectic between global consumers and Japanese producers providing 
everything from ancient Buddhist statues to exquisite paper-making (objects, but 
equally fitting the category of “intangible cultural heritage” in today’s terms). 
Designed to meet international standards as well as appeal to local visitors, Japan’s first 
modern, Western-style museum was established in 1872. 8 The neologism hakubutsu-
kan (literally “building for spreading knowledge through artifacts) was used to label 
this new institution. 9 A vibrant exhibitionary culture had existed throughout the 
Tokugawa period, but the modern museum was more clearly demarcated from 
everyday life, open to the public, and designed to encourage mass education and 
disseminate popular knowledge, especially the bases of scientific knowledge. What is 
today known as the Tokyo National Museum featured displays both of natural history 
and of fine art. It is worth noting that the museum displayed Chinese and Korean 
works, as well as Japanese, including antiquities such as ancient wall paintings, steles, 
wine vessels, and other objects outside the category of fine arts.
 Japan formally established three “imperial museums” in Nara, Kyoto, and Tokyo 
7  The adoption of Confucianism and Buddhism in ancient and medieval Japan is a standard 
trope. Looking at the modern era, in Marilyn Ivy’s phrasing: “Crossing boundaries of race and 
region, of temporalities and territories established at the foundation of the modern world system, 
installed everywhere with its enormous reserves of capital, ‘Japan’ appears ubiquitous, nomadic, 
transnational. Yet at the same time Japan seems to reinscribe the distinction ever more sharply 
between the ‘West’ and itself.” Ivy, Discourses of the Vanishing: Modernity, Phantasm, Japan, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995, p. 5.
8  Aso, Public Properties, pp. 13–15.
9  Ibid., p. 14.
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in 1889—the year that the Meiji emperor promulgated the constitution. 10 That Meiji 
leaders hoped imperial museums would help create modern subject-citizens is clear 
from the timing. The original notion was that each museum would reflect the histor-
ical background of its locality, with Japan’s most ancient objects displayed in Nara, the 
eighth-century imperial capital; objects from the ninth to the eighteenth centuries 
placed in Kyoto, the subsequent imperial capital; and objects from the Tokugawa 
period (1600–1868) and from other parts of Asia exhibited in Tokyo, the shogunal 
capital and the capital of the new Japanese nation. Meanwhile, through the early 
Meiji period, Buddhist temples and Shinto shrines—with their art collections—were 
increasingly open to the public on a regular basis instead of only open specific occa-
sions and even then keeping most of their property off-limits. One reason for this 
move was to raise money locally, but a deeper cultural transformation was also at 
work. New legal issues emerged as well. The ownership of statues and paintings was 
no longer clear. Were they owned by monks or priests, or a temple association, or in 
some sense the nation as a whole?
 Japan’s second major antiquities measure, the Law for the Preservation of 
Ancient Shrines and Temples (Koshaji Hozon Hō), was passed in 1897. This law 
acknowledged the importance of both architecture and objects for what we now call 
national heritage. The term that came to be used was “National Treasure” (kokuhō), 
still used for official lists today. National treasures were to manifest Japanese history, 
to display exemplary importance or craft skills, or to have been associated with an 
imperial visit. These goals were further spelled out in the 1919 Law for the 
Preservation of Historic Sites, Places of Scenic Beauty, and Natural Monuments 
(Shiseki Meishō Tennen Kinenbutsu Hozon Hō). In sum, during the Meiji era’s first 
decades, leaders realized the importance of heritage for foreign tourism as well as the 
role it could play in fostering Japanese identity, a sense of the past, and especially a 
personal connection with the emperor. By the 1880s the government was undertak-
ing national surveys to find National Treasures.
 Two excellent monographs emphasize the state’s role in the imperial period. 
Alice Y. Tseng focuses on museum architecture and Noriko Aso on the creation of a 
national aesthetic in museums. Both point to the importance that Japan’s leaders, 
facing foreign threats, placed on creating a modern nation-state as quickly as possible. 
Tseng argues that—unlike the case in postrevolutionary France—Japan’s new 
10 Tseng, The Imperial Museums of Meiji Japan.
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“national art” could not be formed out of a preexisting imperial collection but rather 
had to be built from a variety of secular and religious sources. Her study focuses on 
four main buildings. Tseng describes how Japan’s first hakubutsukan was built in 
Ueno Park in Tokyo to show exhibitions of Japan’s natural and human-made prod-
ucts, takes us through museum-building in Kyoto and Nara, and concludes with 
Ueno’s Hyōkeikan Art Museum, founded at the beginning of the twentieth century. 
Early Meiji leaders were building a new nation by teaching the Japanese about their 
art historical lineage. In this larger nation-building aim, they also needed foreigners 
to understand Japanese artifacts as “art” (bijutsu was the neologism coined in 1872), 
on par with Western art, rather than mere crafts. Tseng situates her work in the 
understanding that Japanese art was a concept and category “institutionalized, canon-
ized, and standardized under the auspices of the Meiji bureaucracy through the joint 
enterprises of the museum, the exposition, and the academy.” 11 The concept also 
became a major ingredient of Japan’s collective history and identity. Tseng rightly 
emphasizes that the “state” was by no means a unified entity; nevertheless, she states, 
“The Imperial Museums were very much a part of the Meiji state’s self-representation 
as novel and progressive, although dealing directly with the matter of the nation’s 
cultural heritage required a more nuanced treatment that attempted to harmonize 
modern innovation with the ancient origins being celebrated and preserved.” 12 The 
Meiji government hired the Englishman Josiah Conder as a kind of chief state archi-
tect in the late 1870s, and he directed the building of the hakubutsukan using 
masonry construction new to Japan and at least partly based, Tseng shows, on the 
South Kensington Museum. She also reminds us that its construction was simultane-
ous with that of the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York and the Museum of 
Fine Arts in Boston in the United States. Heritigization in Japan, we note again, was 
not a global laggard.
 Conder was to become teacher to a later generation of Japanese architects who 
designed many of the buildings during the mid-Meiji and later periods—Tseng shows 
that to simply call their work “Western” is misleading. Museums not only reposi-
tioned the function and therefore even the essence of objects (from ritual item to art, 
for example) and thus turned them into heritage, but museums themselves became 
architectural heritage. That heritage may survive even when the original buildings do 
11 Ibid., p. 11.
12 Ibid., p. 16.
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not. (In fact, three Meiji-era museums are today designated Important Cultural 
Properties.) Tseng emphasizes that the new Meiji museums were designed by Western 
architects and by Japanese architects trained in Western design, although with the 
addition of Japanese symbols, such as the rising sun flag and the chrysanthemum crest 
now associated with the imperial throne. It might seem odd to use essentially Western 
architecture to house Japanese artifacts, but at least in the late Meiji, Japan’s rulers 
used public architecture to lay claims to global equivalence and modernity; these 
buildings were not imitations of either the West or Japanese tradition.
 Heritage, however, involved more than museums. The need to recall or recreate 
historical memory and identity led to particular value being placed on the entire 
Nara-Kyoto region with its hundreds of temples, palaces, and mausoleums. With the 
emperor’s move to Tokyo in 1868, Kyoto’s status was diminished. Kyoto’s rebranding 
after the Restoration, so to speak, depended on making it both a repository of tradi-
tion and a site of living culture, particularly of the arts. This did not mean that Kyoto 
or even Nara would be sheltered from the tides of Westernization. Still, the former 
capitals began to function as a kind of vast open-air museum or heritage park. By the 
late twentieth century, the entire Nara-Kyoto region would officially become a heri-
tage site, with numerous temples and shrines as well as several landscapes and castles 
listed as World Heritage sites.
 The roots of the Nara-Kyoto region’s heritigization, Tseng shows, lay in early 
Meiji thinking about what we might call the geography of heritage. There was no 
doubt about Tokyo’s new preeminence, but by the time the Constitution was promul-
gated in 1889, “The new Japan was being defined as much by its myth-historic origins 
as by its modernizing objectives, and the two capitals were to be two faces of the same 
coin—Tokyo representing the secular, progressive countenance of Japan, and Kyoto 
representing its sacred, historical countenance.” 13 Given not only Kyoto’s imperial 
past but also its vast collection of palaces, shrines, temples, and mausoleums, it was a 
natural heritage site, but it was also, Tseng emphasizes, to host new, modern educa-
tional institutions and industrial factories. 14 By no means was Kyoto as a whole to 
13 Ibid., p. 95.
14 Tseng’s newer work highlights how Kyoto was maintained—or rebranded—as a symbol of the 
imperial presence through a historical reconstruction process that featured new monumental 
architecture and urban renewal projects as much as preservation schemes. Alice Y. Tseng, Modern 
Kyoto: Building for Ceremony and Commemoration, 1868–1940, Honolulu: University of Hawai’i 
Press, 2018.
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become an ossified “museum.” As for the Imperial Kyoto Museum, after various 
design debates, its architecture combined Japanese elements with a basically 
European-classical design and a special entrance and throne room for the emperor’s 
visits (although the emperor never in fact visited). Proposals to build a more tradi-
tional structure, perhaps of wood, did not make it very far. One can read the final 
museum design as a triumph of Westernization, or one can read it as a claim to 
modernity and the global vocabulary of European classicism in public architecture. 
The Imperial Nara Museum was also designed as a classical—and hence modern—
piece of architecture that stood out from its neighboring shrines and temples. That 
said, one can ask if Nara itself, with little economic activity outside of tourism, has 
been museumified.
 Tseng’s study of the twinned stories of the evolution of Meiji museums and the 
emergence of “art” (bijutsu) as a stable cultural category helps us to also think about 
heritage. These developments imply a distinction between heritage that is inalienable 
(museum buildings, the art placed in them under the control of curators) and heritage 
that can be sold and is hence deemed a lesser form of heritage, or perhaps not heritage 
at all. It is also significant that if the Meiji government’s was the final voice in what 
counted as heritage, other voices—art critics, historians, local politicians—began to 
be heard as well.
 Noriko Aso’s Public Properties emphasizes the effects of shifting conceptions of 
Japan’s imperial image at the end of the nineteenth century. Beginning in the 1890s, 
museums came to be classified as “imperial,” a category that was “being redefined at 
the time to serve as a mediating buffer in negotiating the boundaries between state 
and society and public and private.” At the same time, Aso states, “state cultural 
authority was personalized in the figure of the emperor and his immediate relations, 
veiling an emergent canon under majesty not to be impoliticly scrutinized.” 15 But 
Japan’s museum-building, broadly defined, was not limited to state projects in its 
major cities but included numerous private ventures and even department store 
exhibitions and colonial museums. Although the Meiji state certainly wished to 
“educate” a new kind of citizen-subject or public, Aso emphasizes the diversity of the 
publics (plural) that also formed in a bottom-up, though not necessarily oppositional, 
process: “publicness was, and is, historically negotiated.” 16 Heritage was only one 
15 Aso, Public Properties, p. 3.
16 Ibid., p. 222.
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concern of Meiji leaders, and in spite of the early turn to preservation laws, they 
looked largely to museums and, at least through the 1870s, expositions, to highlight 
Japan’s natural resources and, especially, its economic products, both traditional crafts 
and new industrial manufactures. Aso shows that the balance shifted to various arti-
facts and “art” during the 1880s precisely as these objects were put under the control 
of the Imperial Household Ministry and reclassified as imperial property. We might 
thus conclude that this is how national heritage and the imperial house became 
inextricably linked. This move created a radically new set of property rights, neither 
private nor precisely public. Nonetheless, it did not mark Meiji leaders’ first interest 
in heritage. Aso also cites government findings from as early as 1871 stressing the 
need to preserve antiquities not only for the sake of educating the people and not only 
in terms of the international rivalry noted above but also to “serve as the basis for 
social scientific narratives of historical, technological, and economic development, 
which were in turn necessary to write Japan into the modern world . . . an elite heri-
tage collection.” 17
 Of course, museums required a specific kind of public. Unlike visitors to out-
door expositions, museums demanded order and quiet (no clogs, no dogs, no 
touching). Aso insists that such regulations should not be regarded as exclusive but 
inclusive, although only as long as visitors could follow the rules. Opening in the 
evenings  allowed workers to visit. On the one hand, visitors found artifacts selected 
for their aesthetic value or historical significance, as in any heritage regime; on the 
other hand, these objects now possessed a powerful imperial imprimatur. Throughout 
Japan, protected sites such as burial mounds were not only saved from being paved 
over but also imbued with sacrality. Aso concludes, “Imperialization represented a 
form of appropriation, from common-use forests lands to heritage artifacts, that was 
often difficult to contest, because its rationalization in the name of greater good 
simultaneously encompassed and disavowed both state and public.” 18
 Indeed, beneath Japan’s official narratives, individuals and organizations built 
regional and less elitist exhibitionary cultures through private museums and depart-
ment stores. By the 1920s, these included museums of European art and of Japanese 
folk art and crafts. They also included, under the direction of banking heir Shibusawa 
Keizō, specialized museums such as those dedicated to fishing, literature, toys, 
17 Ibid., pp. 67–68.
18 Ibid., p. 93.
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farmhouses, and the like—the living heritage of the people. Aso argues that the pri-
vate museum-builders were motivated by no less than “reimaging the public in rela-
tion to state and society.” 19 This was perhaps more an effect than a conscious goal, but 
certainly the popularization of heritage was a challenge to state and imperial 
monopolization of heritage claims. Department stores, with their luscious displays of 
consumer goods and special exhibitions and concerts, did not challenge the state 
directly, but they broadened access to cultural knowledge. Such knowledge was meant 
to be consumed as a marker of social status and pleasure rather than passively 
observed and appreciated. As public spaces designed to display items to their best 
effect, department stores and museums shared a number of features. Department 
store exhibitions overlapped with the national museums in presenting canonical 
works, but also featured the works of contemporary arts and crafts (that were, mostly, 
within the reach of the average consumer). Aso is not concerned with whether this 
can be considered heritage, but insofar as artists and craftsworkers (a distinction that 
need not detain us here) were working within traditions and speaking to those tradi-
tions, a heritage perspective remains useful. Indeed, Aso shows, sales were often 
regarded as a way to keep heritage alive. In the postwar years, both department stores 
and museums—now “national” museums rather than imperial—continued to flour-
ish as Japan rebuilt itself as a “culture nation” (bunka kokka). In addition to rewriting 
Japanese heritage as peaceful and artistic rather than martial, Japan’s leaders used the 
1964 Olympics to display “national treasures” and reclaim Japan’s position in world 
artistic heritage.
 In her discussion of Japan’s colonial museums in Taiwan and Korea, Aso empha-
sizes Japan’s claims to a civilizing mission and, at best, an ambivalent judgment on the 
worth of native heritage. To my mind, these institutions highlight the ambiguous 
status of peoples who were colonial subjects but also identified as foreign national 
subjects. 20 Artifacts from the colonies were also, of course, imported to Japan licitly 
and illicitly, publicly and privately. In the public realm, they contributed to a heritage 
19 Ibid., p. 165.
20 Of course, these identity issues worked out very differently in Taiwan and Korea, where Japan 
wished to celebrate but also control the ancient historical ties between the lands that became 
Korea and Japan. Nonetheless, the potential of the notion of a “Great East Asia” heritage that 
would have developed in some tension with national heritage, even Japan’s national heritage, is 
worth further consideration, as is how local peoples “consumed” their distinct heritage as it was 
being curated by Japanese overlords.
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story of the Japanese empire’s expansion.
 Hyung Il Pai’s Heritage Management in Korea and Japan examines the complex 
story of heritagization in Korea under the Japanese. Both the Japanese and Korean 
states have devoted considerable resources to heritage management and heritage 
tourism. Pai traces the roots of the modern Korean sense of heritage to Japan’s heritage 
scholarship and institutions, which in many ways developed in parallel to the muse-
ums discussed above. The central story propagated by the Japanese state was simple: 
ancient Korea and Japan were one race (as confirmed by archaeology), then they were 
separated, and now they were merged again. Pai focuses on archaeology and the her-
itage drive to delve into the deeper and deeper past. From the nineteenth through 
most of the twentieth century, heritage tended to be either nationalist or imperialist. 
It was defined and, in a sense, claimed by the imperialist powers, as suggested in part 
by the general shift from early amateur reports by soldiers and missionaries to profes-
sional surveys conducted by architects and art historians. I would add that while racist 
and Orientalist scholars of the metropole treated colonial heritage as inferior, it could 
nonetheless provide a basis for native identity that would eventually work against the 
colonizing power. And this heritage, which could not be “our” (metropole) heritage, 
was often redefined as global heritage in the late twentieth century, contributing to a 
sense of global identity, however embryonic.
 Be that as it may, Pai’s point is that unearthed artifacts did indeed contribute to 
national stories: “The identification and ownership of art and artifacts recovered from 
the ground, therefore, have been and remain to this day the most contested symbols 
of nationhood. Thus, for more than two centuries the empirical search for a ‘unique’ 
prehistoric past and an unbroken ethnic and cultural continuity is the most powerful 
impetus for archaeological and ethnographic field surveys around the world.” 21 Pai 
emphasizes the importance of not only the loss of antiquities as a spur to Japan’s new 
heritage policies but also the search for “sacred relics”—especially the physical remains 
of tombs—that would back up the imperial myth. As early as the 1870s, the govern-
ment promulgated laws to preserve newly discovered tombs from desecration and to 
manage excavations under the control of the Imperial Household Ministry. Pai cites 
a report from 1900 that reveals leaders’ concerns:
21 Pai, Heritage Management in Korea and Japan, p. xxix.
Western-Language Studies of Japanese Heritage　131
Since the Meiji Restoration, it has come to our attention that our ancient 
remains are being threatened with imminent destruction by the daily expansion 
of infrastructure and transportation. The construction of roads, railroads, canals, 
and factory buildings are cutting down mountains and forests on a daily basis. 
Henceforth, in order not to lose our precious memories of the past, we must 
figure out how best to preserve against further destruction of sacred imperial 
remains that have been passed down for generations. As we know, countries in 
Europe and America have had more than a century of preservation laws to guide 
the preservation of ancient remains, and it is now time for us to do the same. 
Therefore, we must organize our old national records, and authenticate the 
locations of the remains of our imperial ancestral burials, heroes, filial sons, 
patriots, and famous clans in order to uphold and show respect for our imperial 
identity [kokutai]. We want to restore our imperial remains so that we will not 
be ashamed when foreign tourists come to visit our country. The purpose of this 
committee is to create and preserve beautiful sites for eternity to promote our 
great ancestral achievements and their morals embodying filial piety, loyalty, and 
patriotism. Our preservation efforts will create a sense of national landscape 
[kokufū] and encourage the moral education of our citizens [fūkyō]. Our duty as 
citizens is to uphold the imperial lineage [ōtō] embodied in our imperial remains 
and burials so that the authority of the imperial household that has lasted for ten 
thousand generations will continue to shine on for eternity. 22
Archaeology and historical research gave rise to a dilemma, however, although one 
that could not be directly addressed at the time. The evidence suggested that the 
“Yamato race” and the imperial house originated on the Asian mainland and thus 
could not claim Japanese territorial indigeneity. One solution was simply to stress the 
Yamato triumph on the Japanese islands by a conquest-through-charisma supposedly 
seen in the ancient ritual artifacts unearthed by modern archaeologists. 23 This contra-
diction notwithstanding, Yamato origins on the mainland and migration via Korea at 
least marked the race’s distinction from the Ainu. Critically, the Meiji government 
prohibited proper excavations of imperial burial mounds and restricted archaeological 
research. Scholars thus looked for sites in Taiwan, China, Inner Asia, and above all 
22 Cited in ibid., pp. 63–64.
23 The notion of conquest through charisma is echoed in the Chinese classics.
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Korea. And in Korea, the colonial government sponsored archaeologists and 
ethnologists.
 Pai shows that heritagization processes in modern Japan and Korea were so 
intertwined as to be inseparable. This was true not only for scholars who wrote about 
both places but also for the tourism industry. Japanese and foreign tourists were 
directed to sites in both Japan and Korea, as well as in Manchuria and Taiwan. In the 
case of Korea, they could explore the New Korea that the Japanese were building and 
the old Korea, supposedly built by the same race. Japanese visited Korea (sometimes) 
as part of a spiritual journey that retraced the steps of conquest taken by the emperors 
of old. Korea may have been considered important merely as a way station for 
Buddhist art and Chinese architecture on their way to Japan, where they would be 
refined, but the result was also a distinctively “Korean” prehistory and history. Pai 
emphasizes that Japan’s prewar myths and ideology that shaped the development of 
archaeology and heritage continue to influence attitudes today, as “citizens in Japan’s 
former colonies in China, the two Koreas, and Taiwan also continue to identify with 
the old platitudes concerning the indigenous, prehistoric origins of distinct races, 
which they have incorporated into their new nationalistic narratives to explain the 
ethnic foundations of their respective modern ethnic states. . . . [and thereby] buying 
into ‘demeaning’ nineteenth-century colonial racial and ethnic stereotypes.” 24 
Nonetheless, in my view, it was not that hard for Japan’s story of Korean devolution 
to become postwar Korea’s story of cultural glory. This narrative adoption explains 
why Korea frequently demands the return of the numerous artifacts “stolen” by the 
Japanese from the 1880s onward.
Heritage, Castles, and Japan-ness
In Japan’s Castles, Oleg Benesch and Ran Zwigenberg emphasize the changing func-
tions and symbolism of the country’s well-known avatars and argue for “the centrality 
of castles to Japan’s modern history” as “tools for crafting identities.” 25 While many 
castles were left to rot or turned into parks in the 1870s, from the late nineteenth 
century through the Pacific War others came to symbolize power and, as military 
garrisons, fostered an “identification” between civilians and the military. After the 
24 Ibid., p. 171.
25 Benesch and Zwigenberg, Japan’s Castles, pp. 2–3.
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war, castles came to represent national heritage in a more general sense, especially 
through a romantic image of the medieval warrior. Benesch and Zwigenberg also 
emphasize that castles have served as sites of contestation between local and national 
authorities—associated with local historical figures, castles potentially challenge ele-
ments of the imperial or national ideology. Moreover, they provide a legitimate space 
for civil society to demand or protest government actions concerning castles. This is 
not to say, however, that either officialdom or civil society ever spoke with one voice, 
and Benesch and Zwigenberg explore the claims of numerous groups, including 
Shinto and other religious groups. Finally, the authors also directly analyze complex 
heritage issues: How should castles be maintained and reconstructed? To what degree 
should “authenticity” be sought? For whom are castles to be preserved? How are their 
individual stories to be told? To what extent should we understand Japanese castle 
heritage as part of a global phenomenon?
 Japan’s Castles is an innovative and fascinating study that speaks to central 
questions of modern Japanese history. Benesch and Zwigenberg treat as largely sym-
bolic the functions or effects of castles, which tended to dominate the cities and towns 
that grew around them. That symbolic effect was, however, important: castles were 
central to the ideologies of militarization until 1945 and of demilitarization after 
1945. In addition, when we contrast hard, coercive power to the symbolic, the 
authors show how castles, turned into military garrisons, aided police in suppressing 
urban disorder at key moments. As noted above, not all castles survived the early 
Meiji government’s disdain for Tokugawa feudalism; they were also expensive to 
maintain. Still, by the 1920s, as what we might call key nodes of militarization, castles 
came to be “celebrated as a unification of modernity and tradition, imperial and local, 
military and civilian.” 26 Castles have also been subject to constant reconstruction. 
From a purist point of view, none are purely “authentic,” and even for nonpurists, 
much reconstruction has been simply horrific. Yet, from another point of view, Japan’s 
castles are living monuments. Related to this point, the authors might have done 
more to frame the modern history of Japanese castles in terms of forgetting. Heritage 
is, simply, a set of memory prompts. But precisely as the functions of castles and their 
very architecture have changed (as Benesch and Zwigenberg show), their actual pasts 
have also been selectively mythologized and, to a large extent, discarded. That said, 
the authors convincingly argue for a degree of continuity in the story of Japanese 
26 Ibid., p. 12.
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castles across the watersheds of both 1868 and 1945. Above all, castles represent 
authority and the very idea of continuity itself.
 Castles also represent heritage. Though heritage is not the main focus of Benesch 
and Zwigenberg’s book, I highlight in the following paragraphs what they have to say 
about the topic. They note that Nagoya Castle and Edo Castle were among the first 
architectural sites to be valued for their historical importance. There was agreement 
and cooperation on this point among Japanese and Europeans—who were in the 
midst of restoring their own castles. If the early Meiji government was concerned with 
the export of artworks, certain elites maintained a broader appreciation of the built 
heritage. At the same time, early Meiji heritage was less about preserving the past in 
the face of a rapidly intruding future than it was more deliberately constructed to 
support the new imperial ideology. The limited castle renovations executed at the time 
were, therefore, often funded by the Imperial Household Ministry. While Benesch 
and Zwigenberg emphasize parallels to European uses of medieval castles to shore up 
the authority of modernizing monarchies, in the larger comparative framework of 
attitudes toward heritage, Japanese attitudes through the 1870s were distinctively less 
sentimental and romantic.
 Benesch and Zwigenberg argue that the military’s takeover of castles, symboliz-
ing authority and allowing troops to easily suppress urban disorder demonstrates the 
existence of “Taishō militarism” in parallel with “Taishō democracy.” The army had 
little interest in heritage, but local civil groups often did, which might result in a dual-
use castle: a garrisoned castle space also opened to the public (for whom historical 
explanation is provided), allowing reconstruction and preservation work. Other castle 
sites became parks, often with shrines, under the effective control of local elites or 
what the authors call “civil society.” Castles were also turned into government offices. 
Castles gradually became symbols both of local pride and of a new national “martial 
identity” in a process that was, in Benesch and Zwigenberg’s view, “largely organic” 
and lacking in clear governmental policy. 27 Attributing almost mystical powers to 
castles, the authors claim they “had unique potential for uniting conflicting layers of 
local, regional, national, imperial, and religious identity, while transcending temporal 
boundaries between the past, present, and future through the combination of heritage 
architecture, contemporary memorials, and futuristic displays at industrial, commer-
cial, and later colonial exhibitions.” Heritage was but one aspect of castles in modern 
27 Ibid., p. 63.
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Japan.
 A major turning point in castle heritage—and Japanese culture as a whole—
according to Benesch and Zwigenberg, was the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895). 
Japan’s martial past was rediscovered, and new preservation societies, perhaps ironi-
cally, saw the need to protect castles from military as well as civilian rebuilding proj-
ects. What Benesch and Zwigenberg show, if not in so many words, is another face of 
heritage. Japanese understanding of castles evolved from old relics to “prominent 
symbols of a masculine Japanese culture that united martial and aesthetic elements 
rooted in the distant past” and contributed to mass mobilization in the 1930s. 28 This 
transformation reminds us that heritage is living and useful: heritage sites, to function 
properly, should have thousands of visitors who take something away from their vis-
its. (The professional work of historians, by contrast, may have many fewer consumers 
and need not proclaim its usefulness.) The use of castle sites for various exhibitions 
also marked their living functions. By the 1910s, considerable professional theoriza-
tion about castles began to link national purity equally to militarism and to a suppos-
edly unique aesthetics.
 Since the postwar period, for all the political conflicts surrounding castles that 
Benesch and Zwigenberg convincingly describe, Japanese castles have become more 
ordinary heritage sites: their symbolic importance is still contested but probably less 
central to national identity, and the discourses surrounding them more prominently 
feature questions of preservation and authenticity, promote tourism, shape urban 
development, raise funds, and reclaim local identities. Japanese leaders essentially 
demilitarized their old castles, and even conservatives reimagined castles as symbols of 
culture and peace. Of course, that military fortifications could be proclaimed symbols 
of peace is proof of how flexible heritage can be. Beyond this, Benesch and 
Zwigenberg tell us, Japanese turned to rebuilding castles in the wake of the 
Occupation to reconnect with heritage—albeit a heritage that recalled the Edo and 
early Meiji periods and skipped over the rest. At the same time, the reinvention of 
castles was a fraught process: “controversy was a hallmark of castle building every-
where. . . . entangled with the larger issues of memory politics.” 29 Some people were 
concerned with castles’ authenticity even if rebuilding virtually from scratch; others 
were concerned with erecting something that would simply look like a castle, 
28 Ibid., p. 140.
29 Ibid., p. 277.
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preferably with a parking lot and flush toilets; yet others would rather build schools 
and community halls on available sites. The authors convincingly conclude that the 
modern history of castles is a story of erasure (and construction) and erasures of ear-
lier erasures. In the late Meiji and Taishō periods, the early Meiji rejection of “samurai 
feudalism” was erased, while in the postwar period the links between castles and 
Japanese militarism were erased as a new view of the Tokugawa period (focusing on 
its culture) was constructed. And in the Heisei period, new castle projects sought to 
use more “authentic” wood to rebuild Shōwa-era concrete reconstructions. Whether 
Japan’s castles—and heritage generally—can ever present more complete historical 
views, the authors do not say.
 In Heritage Politics, Tze May Loo presents an extensive case study of Shuri 
Castle, illuminating Okinawa’s long and often painful relationship to Japan proper. 30 
The king of the Ryūkyū Kingdom was evicted from the castle in 1879 by the new 
Meiji authorities, and the islands became Okinawa Prefecture. Loo convincingly 
argues that Shuri Castle became a symbol of oppression—but also a site where 
Okinawans could in effect negotiate or attempt to negotiate that relationship. Yet 
overall, Loo seems to conclude, if not in so many words, that the Okinawans had little 
success, at least if judged in terms of a desire to forge their identity on their own 
terms. Rather, they had to use Japanese standards of identity, albeit for their own 
purposes. Just as the Meiji government had quickly moved to recognize Japan’s 
national treasures, so the listing of Shuri Castle as “cultural heritage” gave Okinawa a 
certain status, if still a subordinate one. If I understand Loo correctly, Okinawan 
claims to citizenship thus represented both agency and self-repression. Meiji practice 
was to “preserve and appropriate” only certain aspects of Okinawan cultural heritage, 
claiming them as Japanese. Ironically, the US Occupation of Okinawa after 1945 
refocused the target of Okinawan oppositional politics from Japan to the US, which 
fostered a sense of Japanese identity.
 Shuri Castle, Loo suggests, originally symbolized the Ryūkyū Kingdom’s 
30 Loo, Heritage Politics.
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“quasi-independence” from both China and Tokugawa Japan. 31 (The castle displayed 
both Chinese and Japanese architectural features.) The Meiji military occupation of 
the castle erased this earlier significance, but the garrison moved out in 1896. At that 
point, local elites sought to restore the castle and spoke, in ways familiar at the time, 
of combining new functions at the site to incorporate a park, leisure activities, a 
museum, and economic development. They sought, Loo argues, to find a place for 
Okinawa as a distinctive but equal part of the empire. However, as plans proceeded to 
build the Okinawa Shrine at the site, the prefecture lacked the funds to restore and 
maintain the castle, which was thus slated for demolition. Fortunately, no less a figure 
than the pioneering architect and architectural historian Itō Chūta saved it. At Itō’s 
urging, the Home Ministry ordered that demolition be stopped and provided fund-
ing to preserve the castle. However, Itō also turned the main hall into the shrine’s 
Worship Hall. Loo argues, Itō’s intervention shows how Japan essentially monopo-
lized knowledge production in Okinawa. Native Okinawans had little voice in the 
preservation, much less the definition, of their own heritage. In the view of Japanese 
like Itō, Okinawan culture displayed cosmopolitan Asian influences, but its people 
were of the Yamato race. Precisely because Okinawans were civilized, they could be 
brought into the empire. At the same time, in this view, Okinawan culture was at its 
“base” Japanese and indeed in some respects represented true Japanese cultural prac-
tices that had been lost in Japan itself.
 In the 1920s and 1930s, the Shuri castle-shrine was the subject of larger compet-
ing discourses about assimilation, local traditions, language, and the like. Okinawan 
civilization was sometimes conceptualized as spiritual rather than materialistic. The 
new Okinawa Shrine was not very popular, but Japan’s “spiritual mobilization,” Loo 
shows, allowed Okinawan intellectuals to use the state to protect their own heritage 
31 Loo’s work neglects two important issues, however. First, Loo does not address the extent to 
which her generalizations about Okinawan opinion apply beyond the views of Okinawan elites 
and intellectuals; she does point to disagreements among Okinawans themselves about preserva-
tion versus development and some identity issues, but generally treats Okinawans as possessing a 
single voice. Second, if it is true that Shuri Castle represented the independence (if a qualified and 
balanced independence) of the Ryūkyū Kingdom vis-à-vis China and Japan into the nineteenth 
century, to what extent did Okinawan memory understand the castle as a symbol of the victors of 
the fifteenth-century Okinawan wars, repressive in its own way? Loo’s own notion of erasure 
might come into play here: Shuri Castle soon erased the interisland wars of the various Ryūkyū 
kingdoms; the Meiji erased the castle’s signification of Ryūkyū’s independence; and the US 
Occupation erased the Shinto past and to some extent the castle’s Japanese-ness.
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to a degree. After the Pacific War, Shuri Castle’s history as a Shinto shrine, Loo signifi-
cantly points out, was largely erased. As Okinawan intellectuals spoke critically of 
both the US and Japan, there was a certain rewriting of the former Ryūkyū kingdom’s 
history through the discourse of a pre-Satsuma golden age of brave and peaceful 
traders. After Okinawa was returned to Japan in 1972, advocates cited the need to 
strengthen Okinawan culture in calling on the national government to rebuild the 
castle. There was a strong feeling that after Okinawa’s mistreatment, Japan should do 
no less. The rehabilitation of heritage not totally destroyed by the war and of the other 
islands’ heritage took second place. Shuri Castle, then, has come to represent victim-
ization but also resilience for Okinawan identity. 32
Intangible Cultural Heritage
Castles, museum artifacts, canonical artworks—these tangible objects have all come 
to represent Japan’s heritage and identity since the Meiji Restoration. But while 
European heritage was being discovered in monumental constructions—great stone 
churches, abbeys, and manors—Japan had little comparable architecture, since most 
building was done in wood, except in the case of castles. Indeed, foreign visitors to Ise 
Shrine in the early Meiji period, for example, could not decide whether it was new or 
old. Either way, objects simply could not represent the full range of cultural practices 
that were constitutive of heritage, as soon as anyone so viewed them. While heritage 
is generally perishable outside of Europe, Sylvie Guichard-Anguis argues that it was 
Japan that first moved to protect intangible forms of heritage, building a new legal 
regime for it in the 1950s and, over the following decades, pushing for UNESCO 
recognition of its importance. 33 The issue was not entirely new to the postwar period, 
of course. Jordan Sand points out that Ise Shrine’s periodic rebuilding informed 
Japanese attitudes toward heritage generally. 34 Early in his career, Itō Chūta doubted 
that a clear line of progress could be traced in Japanese architectural history, but he 
32 Shuri Castle was again destroyed by a fire in October 2019 (after Heritage Politics was pub-
lished). The Japanese government and UNESCO have both announced support for rebuilding; it 
would be interesting to know how Loo understands today’s discourses on the castle.
33 Sylvie Guichard-Anguis, “Patrimoine immatériel japonais, du défilé de char à la corbeille de 
bambou,” L’Information géographique vol. 81, no. 2, 2017, pp. 55–74.
34 Jordan Sand, “Japan’s Monument Problem: Ise Shrine as Metaphor,” Past and Present, February 
2015, pp. 126–152.
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later came to see the practice of renewing and rebuilding as a unique feature of 
Japanese culture. Sand notes, “Since 1897, preservationists in Japan had made it a 
practice to completely dismantle state-designated architectural monuments, study the 
condition of wooden structural members, then reassemble them, usually restoring the 
building to its earliest documentable form. This practice of dismantling calls to mind 
the periodic renewal at Ise. . . . The 1897 law, however, altered the significance of the 
practice by making revival of the original historical form rather than simply mainte-
nance its motive.” 35 Ise’s emergence in the global as well as Japanese imagination may 
reflect a longing for perpetual renewal based on deep ecology or a belief that a replica 
may be as “authentic” as the original. Regardless, as Sand suggests, it would seem by 
now a rejection of common sense to deny that heritage is a useful way to frame our 
understanding of Ise and other shrines as sites of cultural practices as much as they are 
architectural or historical sites.
 As Guichard-Anguis points out, Japanese argued first for two main forms of 
cultural practice to be recognized as “intangible cultural heritage”: the performing arts 
and crafts. However, the concept of intangible cultural heritage seems even harder to 
pin down than that of tangible cultural heritage. Granted, crafts and, for that matter, 
rituals do have links to tangible heritage. And granted, oral traditions and performing 
arts can be specified. But what social practices passed among the generations are not 
part of our intantible cultural heritage? A case in point is cuisine. In a series of articles, 
Voltaire Cang discusses the paradoxes of UNESCO’s designation of (“traditional”) 
Japanese cuisine—washoku—as an intangible cultural heritage in 2013. 36 Food is 
certainly central to culture and identity, as anthropologists and many eaters have long 
known. Yet UNESCO and the countries vying for listing cannot answer the simple 
question “why not list all the world’s ever-changing cuisines?” The Japanese bid for 
washoku’s World Heritage status was largely modeled on the successful bids of the 
“Gastronomic Meal of the French,” the “Mediterranean Diet,” and “Traditional 
Mexican Cuisine.” We might also mention Turkish coffee and Croatian gingerbread, 
though these are more specific foods, not cuisines. In theory, UNESCO status does 
35 Sand, pp. 143–144.
36 Voltaire Cang, “Unmaking Japanese Food: Washoku and Intangible Heritage Designation,” 
Food Studies vol. 5, no. 3, 2015, pp. 49–58; “Japan’s Washoku as Intangible Heritage: The Role of 
National Food Traditions in UNESCO’s Cultural Heritage Scheme.” International Journal of 
Cultural Property vol. 25, no. 4, 2018, pp. 491–513; and “Policing Washoku: The Performance of 
Culinary Nationalism in Japan,” Food and Foodways vol. 27, no. 3, 2019, pp. 232–252.
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not apply to just any French or Japanese meal. French food qualifies when it is cele-
bratory and festive, uses local products, and follows the sequence from the aperitif 
through at least three courses before ending with cheese and dessert and liqueurs. 37 
For washoku, too, UNESCO emphasizes its festival nature in addition to its tech-
niques of drawing out the flavor of fresh ingredients and its “respect for nature.” Cang 
highlights the distinction between UNESCO’s goal of maintaining global diversity—
an argument countries can make to UNESCO is that their cuisine is under threat—
and Japan’s (and France’s) narrow and “standardized” views of cuisine. Within Japan, 
what of regional variations? What of popular dishes like Japanese curry—should this 
dish be deemed merely inauthentic Indian cuisine? Outside of Japan, what of cosmo-
politan experiments? Should America claim the California roll as its particular heri-
tage? Cang points to a dystopia of gastrodiplomacy and sushi police—indeed, Japan 
created quasi-government organizations that could certify restaurants as washoku or 
not. But when did washoku become heritage? The term emerged in the early Meiji to 
distinguish Japanese food from Western cuisine (yōshoku). Was it actually under threat 
a century later? Does UNESCO listing do more than satisfy the appetites of culinary 
nationalists? Does it create a new threat, that of ossification, or does it ultimately 
make no difference?
 Scholars frequently note the key role Japan played in convincing the global 
community that intangible cultural heritage was indeed a key, valid, or authentic 
form of heritage worth preservation. But they have neglected Japan’s ongoing use of 
heritage as soft power in its international diplomacy. Natsuko Akagawa’s Heritage 
Conservation in Japan’s Cultural Diplomacy elegantly remedies this neglect, discussing 
both the background of Japan’s prewar development of heritage and its postwar use of 
heritage in affecting a new global posture. 38 In addition to exercising soft power, 
Akagawa argues, Japan is also projecting its national identity by aiding heritage proj-
ects abroad. Her book concludes with a case study of Japan’s aid to Vietnamese heri-
tage protection that began in the 1990s. The ancient city of Hue symbolized, for the 
Vietnamese government, the country’s postwar unification. However, the city’s his-
toric precolonial buildings had to be restored after wartime destruction. By the 1990s, 
official history was being rewritten to legitimize the Nguyen dynasty, rather than 
37 I feel quite satiated now. See UNESCO, “Dossier de candidature n° 00437 pour l’inscription 
sur la liste représentative du patrimoine culturel immatériel en 2010,” https://ich.unesco.org/doc 
/src/07491-FR.pdf.
38 Akagawa, Heritage Conservation in Japan’s Cultural Diplomacy.
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writing its rulers off as reactionary collaborators. According to Akagawa, Japanese aid 
and expertise played an important role in reconstructing what became the Hue 
Monuments Complex, which received World Heritage listing in 1993. Waseda 
University scholars were chosen to work with Vietnamese and French researchers to 
determine what early nineteenth-century Hue would have looked like. In addition to 
such work on tangible heritage, Japanese scholars also participated in projects to 
recover Vietnamese court music and theater. In her study, however, Akagawa assumes, 
rather than explores, the relationship between Japanese aid and Vietnamese-Japanese 
relations.
 In my reading, the fundamental value of Akagawa’s study lies not in the case 
study or even her argument for the importance of heritage in Japan’s soft power 
diplomacy. Her work rests on a broad scaffolding consisting of two main pillars: a 
theoretical discussion of heritage, nationalism, and identity and a thorough examina-
tion of official documents. Akagawa suggests that prewar Japanese national identity 
shifted from a mix of cultural, political, and military values (I would add racial values) 
to the postwar cultural and economic identity. 39 In some ways, this shift was a rejec-
tion of the past, but it was also a reconstruction of the past by rethinking its heritage. 
Akagawa points out that the term “cultural properties” (bunkazai) was used for the 
first time in the heritage laws enacted under the Occupation in 1950, specifically 
including intangible heritage such as performing arts and conservation techniques 
along with artifacts, monuments, historical sites, and the like. Occupation authorities 
removed putatively militaristic heritage items from official heritage lists. Meanwhile, 
“vernacular heritage,” such as traditional farmhouses, became important to cultural 
identity as postwar rebuilding and economic growth led to the demolition of such 
historic structures as had survived the war. Akagawa recognizes but does not fully 
explore how the distinction between high and popular culture plays out in heritage 
politics, which perhaps mostly revolves around the economics of tourism. But behind 
questions of how to make money from elegant netsuke or humble farmhouses, I 
believe, lies an anxiety of loss.
 Akagawa and others clearly show that Japan’s role in the postwar international 
heritage regime was to help transform attitudes toward “authenticity.” In my view, 
current scholarship correctly treats the concept as inherently ambiguous. In the case 
of ruins, standard heritage practice has held that any restoration work is to be clearly 
39 Ibid., p. 35.
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marked. The Venice Charter of 1964 defined authenticity in four aspects: design, 
material, craft, and setting; it was clear even at the time that authenticity was, at best, 
a matter of degree. Akagawa points out that Japanese were not alone in saying that 
European standards of authenticity could not apply to the rest of the world. Further, 
the whole paradigm linking heritage to high culture rather than everyday life was 
breaking down. The Nara Document on Authenticity, approved in 1994, at least 
broadened the concept of conservation to include periodic dismantling and rebuild-
ing. And in the long run, it “has influenced conservation philosophy by recognizing 
the significance of the different contexts of heritage” and doing away with set rules. 40
 Aurélie Élisa Gfeller points also to the international backing for change at the 
Nara Conference (which approved the Document on Authenticity) and to the larger 
rethinking in both Europe and the non-West of the concept of authenticity. 41 In the 
politicking leading up to the Nara Conference, Japan was joined by Canada and 
Norway, each also interested in the conservation of wood structures among other 
issues. Gfeller thus emphasizes the larger global and historical context leading to the 
fundamental rethinking of global heritage. The notion of authenticity as a global 
heritage norm had taken root by the mid-twentieth century, but the preservationist 
movement also increasingly acknowledged the authenticity of later accretions. That, 
for example, it was not necessary—and indeed wrong—to “restore” a twelfth-century 
cathedral to its original form: its additions of the fifteen and even the nineteenth 
centuries were inextricably part of its authentic nature. This approach to materiality 
at least implicitly acknowledged ongoing cultural traditions. The further recognition 
of non-Western conservation methods, not to mention new vernacular and industrial 
heritage, greatly broadened the concept of authenticity. The Nara Document on 
Authenticity that emerged out of these moves, Gfeller argues, attempted to combine 
universal standards of heritage but in a way that recognized different cultural 
approaches to questions of authenticity. 42 It would seem that some commitment to 
“authenticity” was to remain universal to heritage work, but that everyone (or every 
“culture”) could define for themselves what constituted authenticity.
 The Nara approach both recognized and depended on a concept of intangible 
heritage, which was arguably most central to Japanese heritage practices. Even 
40 Ibid, p. 71.
41 Aurélie Élisa Gfeller, “The Authenticity of Heritage: Global Norm-Making at the Crossroads 
of Cultures,” American Historical Review vol. 122, no. 3, 2017, pp. 758–791.
42 Ibid., pp. 782–783.
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tangible heritage can be judged as authentic on the basis of whether conservation 
techniques preserve its spirit—the very essence of intangible heritage. That is, living 
practice (intangible heritage) maintains tangible heritage such as shrines and temples 
or, for that matter, churches, but not necessarily by leaving them unchanged. Historic 
buildings and districts are also generally used in daily life and, unlike museumified 
structures (such as castles), may not be able to be preserved otherwise. For Akagawa, 
a key point was Japan’s readiness to promote an “Asian” approach to conservation. As 
Japan became an economic powerhouse by the 1980s, it became the largest donor to 
UNESCO. It also devoted a considerable portion of its foreign aid to heritage proj-
ects, especially in the Asia-Pacific region—and promoted a Japanese view of heritage, 
which we can best see as an “expression of nationalism.” 43 Of course, cultural diplo-
macy was only one aspect of Japan’s foreign policy, which was primarily shaped by the 
alliance with the United States, but its independent soft power became increasingly 
important. Foreign aid for heritage projects was codified in law in 2006, which 
Akagawa argues has strengthened ties with other Asian countries. Projects have 
included conservation work on Angkor Wat, Borobudur, and Ayutthaya across 
Southeast Asia but also in China (Dunhuang) and North Korea. With Japanese sup-
port, UNESCO adopted the Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural 
Heritage in 2003, which, as Akagawa seems to suggest, both reflected and promoted 
a trend toward marking the “representative” rather than only the “outstanding” as 
heritage. Broad and ambiguous definitions have led to considerable wheeling and 
dealing at UNESCO meetings.
 Another issue Akagawa raises is language. Do the Japanese terms best translated 
as “genuineness” or “reliability” adequately convey the notion of “authenticity” in 
Western languages? 44 There was, of course, little need to refer to “tangible cultural 
heritage” until the concept of “intangible cultural property” (mukei bunkazai 無形
43 Akagawa, Heritage Conservation in Japan’s Cultural Diplomacy, p. 44. Akagawa also remarks, a 
little too strongly, on Japan’s development assistance: “Japan’s desire to be the leader of Asia and 
ultimately a leader in the global arena has not changed since the pre-World War II period” (p. 
113).
44 Akagawa, Heritage Conservation in Japan’s Cultural Diplomacy, citing Itō Nobuo, 
“‘Authenticity’ Inherent in Cultural Heritage in Asia and Japan,” in K. E. Larsen, ed., Nara 
Conference on Authenticity in Relation to the World Heritage Convention, Nara, Japan, November 
1–6, 1994, Proceedings, Paris: UNESCO World Heritage Centre, 1995, pp. 35–45. See also 
Natsuko Akagawa, “Rethinking the Global Heritage Discourse—Overcoming ‘East’ and 
‘West’?,” International Journal of Heritage Studies vol. 22, no. 1, 2016, pp. 14–25.
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文化財) or heritage came to the fore in the 1994 Nara Conference, which required 
fundamentally rethinking what authenticity could actually mean.  Masahiro Ogino 
has attempted to work out the theoretical underpinnings of the centrality of intangi-
ble heritage to Japanese heritage practices, discussed by many of the authors cited 
above. 45 He regards as distinctive if not unique to Japan what he calls the “logic of 
actualization,” or how “the past is brought up to date in the present”—essentially, 
intangible heritage. In contrast to European heritage practice, Japanese practice relies 
less on monuments that firmly recall the past or museum artifacts that suggest a linear 
history. Rather, it relies more on, for example, “Living National Treasures,” or the 
ongoing production of heritage. Ogino’s point is that “practicing traditional art is not 
aimed at faithfully preserving the heritage of the past, but at bringing what is deemed 
to have existed in the past to the present.” 46 Traditions have no “fixed embodiment” 
but exist only as they are “actualized”—as in a theatrical performance, for example, 
but also in pottery, where the heritage value lies not in the clay vessel but in the pro-
cess of its making. In other words, the past is actualized not in any object but in living 
people. Less convincingly, Ogino argues that even some objects or sites like Kyoto 
palaces and temples are actualized in this sense, which is to say divorced from every-
day life but still used and so brought into the present. Ogino argues that the tradi-
tional Japanese conception of time was not linear and that this nonlinear view of time 
encouraged the blanket rejection of traditional things (such as castles, as we have seen) 
in the early Meiji rush of imported modernity. Then, when Japanese realized ancient 
things should be preserved for their historic value, though they still did not fit any 
linear scheme, actualization offered a way to bring them into the present.
 Ogino discusses a second approach to heritage that he finds common in Japan 
and also in many late-modern societies, namely the desire to preserve the present (or 
very recent past). I am tempted to call this “heritage of the present.” Ogino cites the 
new category of “industrial heritage”; one can also think of museums devoted to the 
1980s and even more recent periods. Ogino, however, goes on to trace what he calls 
a “doubling of the world” to the loss of traditional sacred centers, which causes people 
to seek “transitional places” such as shopping centers and tourist destinations that are 
45 Masahiro Ogino, “Considering Undercurrents in Japanese Cultural Heritage Management: 
The Logic of Actualisation and the Preservation of the Present,” in Akira Matsuda and Louisa 
Elena Mengoni, eds., Reconsidering Cultural Heritage in East Asia, London: Ubiquity Press, 2016, 
pp. 15–29.
46 Ibid., pp. 17–18.
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visited briefly and at least partly as an escape from everyday life. People are able to go 
back and forth between such sites and their everyday lives, resulting in a sense of 
actually living in two separate worlds, thus creating a doubling effect. 47 In an example 
that would apply globally, residents who live in registered historic housing live in 
these two worlds all the time. One is tempted to push this argument, however, in 
directions further than Ogino seems to go. Do not all people conscious of the past live 
in a doubled world? Is not all heritage, like all history, inherently part of the present, 
which is thereby doubled?
Postwar and Local Heritage
In addition to the monographs cited above, scholars have produced seemingly hun-
dreds of articles examining specific cases of heritage work in modern Japan. I have not 
attempted a systematic exploration of these studies from the frontiers of anthropol-
ogy, geography, history, economics, tourism, and other fields. Rather, I discuss below 
selected examples of such recent work. However, I must begin by noting a lacuna in 
this review essay, though one that also reflects the use of the framework of heritage in 
modern Japanese studies. That is, the large literature on Shinto and shrines seldom 
directly raises heritage issues. Shinto scholars certainly touch on related issues—
symbolic narrative, identity, memory, power, and contestation as well as preservation, 
maintenance, funding, public access, and so forth—but they seldom discuss these 
issues in terms of “heritage.” One reason for this may be the Shinto establishment’s 
resolute rejection of any official heritage status and perhaps the very idea of heritage. 
An idea, put baldly, may be that if Shinto represents constant renewal, then it is new, 
and then it cannot represent heritage (old). Further, the custodians of particular 
shrines fear any outside influence. According to Jordan Sand, Ise priests not only 
regard the shrine as the emperor’s gift to his people but proclaim that the shrine is the 
emperor’s property. 48
 No doubt, visiting a shrine can be a religious experience, a touristy pleasure, a 
pleasant outing, or a heritage experience, or all of the above at once. But while shrines 
are never merely heritage, many visitors likely see them through the lens of heritage. 
47 Ibid., pp. 24–25.
48 Sand, “Japan’s Monument Problem,” p. 151. The fear that heritage status represents a kind of 
living death is widespread outside of Japan as well and may not be unique to the Shinto 
establishment.
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That said, there seems to be little scholarly literature specifically using that lens to 
discuss shrines (as opposed to the more extensive heritage studies of castles, for 
example). One exception is Jordan Sand’s article on Ise cited above. Sand finds in Ise 
a “versatile metaphor in discourses of Japanese culture, of Asian culture, and of heri-
tage and architectural monumentality.” In addition to raising imponderable questions 
of what counts as authentic, Sand points to various uses of Ise as a symbol of some 
essential Japanese qualities of character or worldview, such as frugality and simplicity 
or the ephemeral nature of reality. Overall, Japanese themselves have emphasized the 
shrine’s antiquity, though an ever-fresh antiquity representative of the kokutai. In the 
postwar period, according to Sand, Ise came more to represent the idea of newness 
within tradition. It is but a step to conclude that heritage is found in practice rather 
than materiality. At any rate, as Akagawa discusses, Ise was a critical case in Japan’s 
arguments for UNESCO to acknowledge intangible cultural heritage.
 Takashi Inada argues that postwar Japan’s heritage policies have increasingly 
taken local populations into account. 49 Inada contrasts the prewar period, with its 
emphasis on the “sacred traces of the Meiji emperor” (Meiji tennō seiseki), to the 1950 
Cultural Property Protection Law (Bunkazai Hogo Hō), which included the heritage 
of localities and popular culture. On the one hand, the new legal regime, still in effect 
today, cited “living heritage” and “regional cultural property”; but on the other hand, 
the legal status of buried material, which as we have seen was off limits as imperial 
property in the prewar period, remains ambiguous. Inada also emphasizes the 
decentralization of heritigization processes. As the categories eligible for protection 
expanded—tangible cultural property, intangible cultural heritage, heritage sites, 
monuments, and landscapes, as well as folk cultural property, folk documents, tradi-
tional building complexes, and cultural landscapes—so did local populations’ role in 
decision-making. Heritage is no longer limited to rare examples of high culture but is 
ever more widespread. But it is also, Inada reminds us, threatened by development.
 If heritagization today is often linked with local identity claims, more and more 
heritage sites are being built out of modern experiences, as Ogino has noted. One set 
of modern experiences stems from the enormous changes that followed Meiji-era 
rapid industrialization. Should old factory complexes and mines be preserved? 
49 Takashi Inada (trans. by Laurent Nespoulous), “L’évolution de la protection du patrimoine au 
Japon depuis 1950: sa place dans la construction des identités régionales,” Ebisu—Études jap-
onaises no. 52, September 2015, pp. 21–46.
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Toshiyuki Morishima has pointed out that efforts to do so since the 1970s have 
resulted in success when various interests are balanced: heritage protection, tourism, 
and urban planning. 50 Key to such projects is cooperation between the Ministry of 
Economy and Industry and the Agency for Cultural Affairs. Morishima has created a 
database of their various projects that shows a certain imbalance or bias toward min-
ing, textile, and military installations at the expense, for example, of transportation 
heritage. Nonetheless, buildings and sites as well as machines and even archives have 
been preserved through government efforts related to UNESCO standards for 
industrial heritage.
 In the case of the Miike Coal Mine heritage site in Fukuoka and Kumamoto, 
Yusuke Matsuura has pointed to two distinct narratives: a more or less official story 
that accentuates the positive and a dissenting narrative that demands this heritage 
acknowledge the contributions of Korean forced labor and the sufferings of Japanese 
workers. 51 Given the need to incorporate Miike into Japan’s application for World 
Heritage status for “Sites of Japan’s Meiji Industrial Revolution,” South Korea was 
able to insist on acknowledgment of Korean forced labor at the mines. Matsuura also 
highlights the “public vernacular memory” of “negative heritage” (fu no isan) held by 
many ex-miners. The mines suffered a slow decline before finally closing in 1997, and 
memories of labor disputes and pit explosions remained fresh. At least locally, World 
Heritage status remained controversial. While the mine sites tell largely the official 
story, memorial markers and memorial services keep alive a darker story.
 Edward Boyle widens the lens to examine the general background of 
UNESCO’s 2015 addition of twenty-three locations to “Sites of Japan’s Meiji 
Industrial Revolution: Iron and Steel, Shipbuilding and Coal Mining.” 52 Treating 
heritage as inherently contested by memory collectives, Boyle points to the tense 
negotiations between Japan, on the one side, and South Korea and China, on the 
other. At stake in the negotiations was a story of successful Westernization and “Asian 
cultural response” versus a story of imperialism and exploitative industrialization. 
50 Toshiyuki Morishima, “Une comparaison des politiques de conservation et de mise en valeur 
du patrimoine industriel de la modernisation au Japon,” Entreprises et Histoire no. 87, June 2017, 
pp. 51–68.
51 Yusuke Matsuura, “World Heritage and the Local Politics of Memory: The Miike Coal Mine 
and fu no isan,” Japan Forum vol. 31, no. 3, 2019, pp. 313–335.
52 Edward Boyle, “Borders of Memory: Affirmation and Contestation over Japan’s Heritage,” 
Japan Forum vol. 31, no. 3, 2019, pp. 293–312.
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Temporality mattered as well: if the story of industrialization ends before 1910, then 
Japan’s colonization of Korea is left out. Following Matsuura, Boyle notes the exis-
tence of voices outside these state-directed narratives but emphasizes that national 
stories tended to dominate—other stories are marginalized or even forgotten.
 Equally ambiguous in its memory-work is “defense heritage,” including both the 
structures of modern Japan’s industrialization and state-building and the premodern 
castles discussed above. Old daimyo castles have become surrounded by an aura of 
romance and adventure, but modern military bases have been neglected, either out of 
antiwar sentiment or from their association with failure better forgotten. 53 Masaaki 
Okada has pointed to the growing reuse of defense sites since the beginning of the 
twenty-first century. Some have been turned into parks; old aircraft shelters have been 
used as warehouses. But it is not clear if this process is actually one of heritigization or 
forgetting. Having said that, we should note that Jung-Sun Han has pointed to gen-
uine popular interest in war-related sites. While the government may wish to ignore 
them, local communities and civil society organizations have sometimes found ways 
to preserve underground factories, bunkers, shelters, and the like. 54 According to 
Han, while some of these heritigization projects highlight the Japan-as-victim narra-
tive, they are recognized as “heritage of bad things” and leave room for counter-nar-
ratives and critical views of Japan. Underground factories, for example, may note the 
presence of enslaved Korean laborers. Highlighting local interest in “dark heritage,” 
Han also points to the generational shift underway by the 1990s, although he does 
not explicitly argue that, compared with those of the war generation, the newer gen-
erations’ memories and views may be less sensitive—or perhaps less defensive or less 
ideological (or ideological in a different way).
 Industrialization everywhere has had its dark side, but “dark heritage” may refer 
to heritage that is exclusively or primarily associated with death or disaster. Dark 
heritage should be distinguished from the notion of “dark tourism” from which is it 
derived, though neither can be defined precisely. Dark tourism—visits to prison sites, 
Holocaust sites, Chernobyl, Fukushima, and so on—may be associated with formal 
memorials but is often criticized for trivializing tragedy and providing voyeuristic 
53 Okada Masaaki, “Interpretation of Defence Heritage in Japan: A Survey of its ‘Neglect and 
Reuse’ and Future Potential as Significant Landscape,” Icon: Journal of the International Committee 
for the History of Technology vol. 17, 2011, pp. 94–106.
54 Jung-Sun Han, “Relics of Empire Underground: The Making of Dark Heritage in 
Contemporary Japan,” Asian Studies Review vol. 40, no. 2, 2016, pp. 287–302.
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thrills. 55 Dark heritage, it seems to me, is more of a convenient label than a precise 
classification. And it is still subject to contestation, as Atsuko Hashimoto and David 
Telfer point out in their discussion of Okinawa Peace Park. 56 The park’s meanings are 
mediated not only by the museum displays but also by the “storytellers” (kataribe), 
who are survivors of the Pacific War and offer guided tours and explanations of the 
exhibits. Not all visitors want to hear their “anti-Japanese” sentiments, Hashimoto 
and Telfer note, while the park itself confounds mainland Japanese expectations of 
war memorials. The bones of the enormous number of Okinawa civilians who died in 
1945 are laid next to those of Japanese soldiers. The memory of the war is neither one 
of Japanese glory nor one of Japanese victimization (as in Hiroshima and Nagasaki), 
or at least not exclusively so. Yet at least one set of lessons revolves around Japanese 
sins: the failure to protect Okinawans from the US invasion, drafting Okinawans for 
the war, turning the islands into US bases, and perhaps its original nineteenth-cen-
tury “colonization” of the islands. Above all, the slaughter of the Battle of Okinawa is 
laid at the feet of the Japanese, not the US invaders. However, Hashimoto and Telfer 
ask what meanings Okinawa Peace Park will convey as the older kataribe are replaced 
by younger generation who did not experience the war personally.
 Examples of what might be considered gray heritage, if not exactly dark heritage, 
are commemorations that put a happy face on inherently unhappy events. One such 
event—taking place over years—was the repatriation of Japanese from Manchuria, 
Korea, and Siberia after the Pacific War. In 2015 UNESCO put a selection of docu-
ments at the Maizuru Repatriation Memorial Museum into its Memory of the World 
International Register. 57 This gave the repatriation documents the same status as the 
Bayeux Tapestry, Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony, and Anne Frank’s diary. Jonathan 
Bull and Steven Ivings argue that, in effect, UNESCO ratified an orthodox account 
of the state bringing people safely back to their homeland. The museum long 
neglected the actual memories of repatriated Japanese who faced difficulties gaining 
55 Will Coldwell, “Dark Tourism: Why Murder Sites and Disaster Zones are Proving Popular,” 
Guardian, October 31, 2013.
56 Atsuko Hashimoto and David J. Telfer, “Contested Geopolitical Messages for Tourists at the 
Okinawa Peace Park and Memorials,” Japan Forum vol. 31, no. 3, 2019, pp. 378–407.
57 Jonathan Bull and Steven Ivings, “Return on Display: Memories of Postcolonial Migration at 
Maizuru,” Japan Forum vol. 31, no. 3, 2019, pp. 336–357. The documents feature diaries and 
notebooks of Japanese interned in Siberia from 1945 into the 1950s, as well as contemporary 
Japanese expressions of concern for the internees.
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acceptance back into Japanese society, not to mention their war memories and the 
memories of people who repatriated themselves without the state’s help. It also 
neglected the Maizuru port’s role in sending Chinese and Koreans away from Japan, 
back to their home countries at the end of the war. By the twenty-first century, the 
museum was looking for ways to tell stories to audiences that had not experienced the 
war, and it broadened its focus. Its UNESCO application emphasized “universal 
themes” such as “the human determination to survive.” One point was that just as 
some Japanese had to be repatriated from Soviet POW camps, so, too, did German 
and Hungarian soldiers face repatriation at the end of the war. This argument could 
lessen any sense of Japanese as having uniquely suffered. Nonetheless, Bull and Ivings 
conclude that the museum still does little to present anything close to the full range 
of voices that would speak to what happened in Maizuru Port.
 Ainu human remains is another painful issue subject to heritigization. 58 Naohiro 
Nakamura discusses some of the controversies surrounding the government’s plan to 
build a memorial hall in Hokkaido to house unidentified Ainu remains that had been 
stored mostly in universities. Anthropologists’ seizure or theft of first nations’ human 
remains has of course been controversial in many countries, and the question of 
whether and how to return them continues to embroil scientific and first nation 
communities today. Nakamura shows that, in Japan’s case, the government became 
involved after Ainu sued Hokkaido University for the remains to be returned. Ainu 
themselves are hardly unanimous about the correct course to follow, but there is 
considerable opposition to the government’s plan for a single memorial hall. While it 
is impossible to trace most remains to individual descendants, many could be 
returned to the burial grounds from which they were originally excavated. Ainu 
communities could then ensure academics could no longer conduct research on the 
remains. As Nakamura describes this story, the issues are not finally settled, and liti-
gation continues. Memorial services could also be held for remains that are returned 
to burial grounds, in which case such “heritigization” would presumably be relatively 
private and low-key. This would not preclude the building of a memorial hall, which 
would require decisions about who would tell what story about the remains.
 The case studies mentioned above clearly involve questions of local identity—
perhaps all heritigization does—but local identity is not their main focus. One issue 
58 Naohiro Nakamura, “Redressing Injustice of the Past: The Repatriation of Ainu Human 
Remains,” Japan Forum vol. 31, no. 3, 2019, pp. 358–377.
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that reoccurs frequently is how official state narratives neglect local views. An example 
is the Miike mines, which are sites of glorious industrialization and economic devel-
opment, or of enslavement and suffering. The local war-related “dark heritage” dis-
cussed by Jung-Sun Han are other examples. More prosaically, heritigization may 
support local pride but comes with costs. As Japan’s rural areas are hollowed out, 
many communities seek to bring in tourist yen. Ōgimachi’s traditional gasshō-style 
farmhouses received World Heritage status in 1995. Takamitsu Jimura has described 
how the community has attempted to deal with problems stemming from the partic-
ular type of tourism that resulted. 59 Tourists certainly come; but especially since 
highway improvements in 2008, they often spend just a few hours at the site and 
move on, rather than patronizing local home-hostels and restaurants. Jimura’s survey 
of residents found that many considered their privacy invaded (tourists did not always 
know what was open to the public and what was not). They also felt the community 
suffered from traffic congestion and that their community spirit had been weakened. 
Young people still leave to find jobs in the city. Nonetheless, Jimura urges that a 
tourism management plan could help; greater provisions for in-depth understanding 
of the village’s history and architecture, for example, would appeal to some tourists 
and encourage longer stays.
 The decision to seek World Heritage status must come from a national govern-
ment, but the impetus might come from local leaders. Or not. Based on his fieldwork 
on an island in Kagoshima Prefecture, Michael Dylan Foster notes that island leaders 
worked to get national recognition for a village ritual as early as the 1970s, but only 
three decades later did the national government push for UNESCO recognition. 60 
The ritual—Toshidon—involves adult males wearing masks traveling from house to 
house scaring children (with family approval, to encourage good behavior) around 
New Year’s. Like other parts of rural Japan, Shimo-Koshikijima has long been suffer-
ing from job loss and population loss—especially of families with children, without 
whom Toshidon would make no sense. Toshidon was listed as “intangible cultural 
heritage” in 2009. Increased tourism and even TV coverage of the rituals, allowed in 
some neighborhoods but not others, followed. According to Foster, villagers enjoy the 
59 Takamitsu Jimura, “The Impact of World Heritage Site Designation on Local Communities—
A Case Study of Ogimachi, Shirakawa-mura, Japan,” Tourism Management vol. 32, no. 2, 2011, 
pp. 288–296.
60 Michael Dylan Foster, “Imagined UNESCOs: Interpreting Intangible Cultural Heritage on a 
Japanese Island,” Journal of Folklore vol. 52, nos. 2–3, 2015, pp. 217–232.
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recognition, though they disagree over how open the ritual should be to outside 
observers (after all, it takes place in people’s homes) and whether their presence 
changes the nature of the ritual. Do children begin performing for the camera? Does 
UNESCO status itself change the very nature of the ritual? Yet without UNESCO 
status, would the ritual survive? Foster does not answer these questions. He is inter-
ested primarily in how “UNESCO” (Yunesuko) is a floating signifier: for some, it 
means global standing and local pride; for others, it means tourism and income; and 
for yet others, it means a responsibility—even a burden—to maintain a ritual that is 
potentially losing its meaning.
 Competing claims also rest on competing interpretations. For example, the 
sacred grove Sēfa Utaki on Okinawa (World Heritage as of 2000) is subject to a pro-
liferation of Okinawan pilgrims, spirit mediums, mainland Japanese tourists, foreign 
tourists, tour guides, and shop owners. Aike P. Rots highlights the conflicts between 
these groups. The grove’s competing uses are under the control of both local authori-
ties and the state because Sēfa Utaki is not attached to an independent religious 
institution; its uses and management are also subject to a great deal of negotiation and 
also buck passing (who pays for upkeep?). 61 Rots emphasizes that the site was radically 
changed by World Heritage status, but his fundamental point is the sheer multiplicity 
of voices and strategies surrounding the site. The history of the “sacred place,” previ-
ously a key worship site of the Ryūkyū Kingdom and long used by local spirit medi-
ums, suggests that all claims to it today are based on essentialized and reductive 
interpretations. In other words, it is true heritage—claimed and contested by diverse 
groups. Some native Okinawans, understanding themselves as participating in tradi-
tional rituals, regard the site as sacred but sense that mass tourism is weakening its 
sacred qualities. Some tourists, by constrast, understand it to be a “power spot” whose 
spiritual functions can be drawn on in new ways. Rots seems to regard the core issue 
as one of Okinawan self-determination, but that does not answer the question of 
authority, for it neglects the competing claims among Okinawans themselves.
 The question of local authority—and authenticity—as opposed to that of the 
central state is certainly not limited to Okinawa. The town of Hiraizumi in Iwate 
Prefecture has been taken as the exemplar of Tōhoku culture. In his study of the his-
torian Takahashi Tomio’s treatment of Hiraizumi, Nathan Hopson is concerned 
61 Aike P. Rots, “‘This Is Not a Powerspot’: Heritage Tourism, Sacred Space, and Conflicts of 
Authority at Sēfa Utaki,” Asian Ethnology vol. 78, no. 1, 2019, pp. 155–180.
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primarily with historiographical issues, but also pays attention to heritage. 62 It was, he 
argues, the archaeological and historical evidence of Hiraizumi’s role in the world 
trading system that prompted the government to seek World Heritage status for it. 
That is, he takes Hiraizumi not as a marginal region of Japan but as a site of interna-
tional significance and thus suitable for UNESCO recognition. (World Heritage 
status was finalized in 2011 in the wake of the Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami.) 
Hopson suggests that Hiraizumi in the immediate postwar period also had the 
advantage of helping to refute the discredited prewar ideology of the homogenous 
nature of the Japanese “race” and polity. If Hiraizumi is understood as a “culturally 
hybrid” regional power that resisted full incorporation into the Japanese state, it may 
foster more pluralistic understandings of Japanese culture. Without going into com-
plex historiographical issues, we can note that it was at least plausible to see Hiraizumi 
as both Japanese and a victim of Japanese expansion, as both culturally autonomous 
and as an integral part of Japan; in a word, as a hybrid. Now recognized as World 
Heritage of significance to all humankind, Hiraizumi remains, in Hopson’s words, “a 
fixture in discourses of Japanese national identity” while, indeed, its new status—
cemented in history—deradicalizes its revolutionary potential. 63
 In the case of Kyoto, very little heritage can be called uniquely local. Nearly 
everywhere are examples of ancient or allegedly ancient arts, temples, shrines, and 
palaces that are all associated one way or another with the imperial house. Kyoto’s 
long centuries as the imperial capital virtually defined the entire region’s status in the 
wake of the Meiji Restoration, as we have seen. Even its supposedly unique features—
the Gion’s geisha culture or Kyoto kaiseki—have become metonyms for Japan. At the 
same time, Kyoto’s heritage also includes the modern, particularly commemoration of 
the Meiji Restoration itself. Visitors to sites connected with samurai martyrs of the 
1860s seek an entirely different kind of experience than visitors to Kinkaku-ji. 64 The 
experience of visiting Restoration sites may still be nostalgic, but it can, Jennifer 
Prough argues, also reflect an attempt to relate “traditional” values of perseverance 
and duty to “modern” ones of youth and openness.
 Still, what we might call the local persists in the national. However much 
62 Nathan Hopson, “Takahashi Tomio’s Phoenix: Recuperating Hiraizumi, 1950–71,” The 
Journal of Japanese Studies vol. 40, no. 2, 2014, pp. 353–377.
63 Ibid., p. 377.
64 Jennifer Prough, “Meiji Restoration Vacation: Heritage Tourism in Contemporary Kyoto,” 
Japan Forum vol. 30, no. 4, 2018, pp. 564–588.
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heritage work in Tokyo and Kyoto is devoted to building memories that foster iden-
tification with the nation, it also speaks to what it means to be from a particular place. 
If it seems obvious that Tōhoku or Okinawa would, in some ways and to some degree, 
define themselves vis-à-vis the Japanese state, this can be true even of Tokyo. Jordan 
Sand’s discussion of the Edo-Tokyo Museum, finished in 1993, highlights its empha-
sis on everyday life. 65 The museum is part of the general movement away from the 
heritage of high culture, as described above, to objects—and even reconstructed 
scenes—that ordinary people could feel represent their own ancestors’ lives, or even 
their own childhood. Thus, the museum includes the interiors of imagined farm-
houses and models of a postwar Tokyo apartment, complete with electrical appli-
ances. (Not included are the factories that made those appliances or the pollution that 
resulted: nostalgia is part of the message). Sand notes, “Privileging the home as the 
site of everyday life elided other sites of community and spaces of commonality, and 
made possible the reinscription in objects or ideological bonds between the individual 
and the state.” 66 Yet the Edo-Tokyo Museum was planned not by the state’s culture 
bureaucrats but by amateur historians and academics supported by the city govern-
ment. Indeed, there is a certain celebration of Tokugawa Edo, implying if not a 
rejection of the Meiji, at least the claim that not all was made new and good in 1868. 
The museum’s story of “Tokyo” goes on to offer, at least in my view, a twinned expe-
rience—of increasing commodification and of certain kinds of losses. Sand points to 
the danger (well understood by the museum’s own leaders) that presentation of 
everyday life may overwhelm us with nostalgia for imagined pasts, whether recent or 
ancient. He highlights the tensions involved in the desire to escape the national nar-
rative of heroic modernization, on the one hand, and romanticizing the local and 
everyday on the other. Many involved in the museum planning did not want to 
present a single authoritative narrative, but museums are by nature authoritative. 
Sand convincingly concludes that heritage today is fragmenting and, in a sense, gives 
more power to audiences in finding meaning; and yet, he notes, the role of the state 
in heritagization has hardly disappeared.
*      *      *
65 Jordan Sand, Tokyo Vernacular: Common Spaces, Local Histories, Found Objects, Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2013, chap. 4.
66 Ibid., p. 115.
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The concept of “heritage” is so capacious as to seem analytically useless. Almost 
everything—perhaps indeed everything—can be regarded as heritage. Into the 
twentieth century, the term most obviously referred to cultural artifacts, especially 
buildings, monuments, and art deemed worthy of preserving for future generations. 
Referring originally to the property bequeathed between the generations in wealthy 
families, “heritage” had acquired by the late nineteenth century its current sense 
applying to the inheritance of larger groups, especially nations. Heritage in this sense 
is integral to modern concepts of identity and represents the “best of the past,” what 
we choose to remember with pride. Heritage is thus always “our heritage”—it defines, 
reflects, supports, and sometimes contests a group consciousness, whether the group 
is the nation, a tribe, a class, an ethnic group, or perhaps humanity as a whole. 
Tangible and intangible objects and practices can formally be declared “heritage” by 
a government or UNESCO, or they may simply be understood as heritage by some-
one or another. 67
 The scope of the concept of heritage exploded in the second half of the twentieth 
century to include “natural heritage”—landscapes of particular beauty or historical 
memory—and especially “intangible heritage.” In this shift, there has been what 
might be reductively expressed as a move from the derivation of identity based on the 
intrinsic cultural or aesthetic value of heritage objects to the derivation of heritage 
based on identities defined as those groups that transmit “traditions, skills, and cus-
toms” (their heritage) over the generations. 68 Heritage, like identity, is always plural 
and also processual (heritagization). Though the studies discussed here focus on 
Japan’s heritage, scholars discuss how it is contested, or at least subject to different 
interpretations, and how proper understanding of it requires a global framework. 
Heritage is complex because it is built on unstable mixtures of official ideology, pop-
ular nostalgia, the commercial media interests, the actions of national and local 
authorities, and international summits. In turn, heritage produces not only identity 
but also power. By no means should our use of the term be limited to sites and prac-
tices approved by UNESCO, or even those recognized by national or local 
governments.
67 This paragraph is broadly based on a portion of the voluminous literature reflecting on heri-
tage; I am generally indebted to the work of G. J. Ashworth, Brian Graham, J. E. Tunbridge, Tim 
Winter, Rodney Harrison, Laurajane Smith, David Harvey, and above all David Lowenthal.
68 One might add: and marketed as such. See John L. Comaroff and Jean Comaroff, Ethnicity, 
Inc., Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009, esp. chap. 2.
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 As UNESCO’s lists grow and grow and as every possible group seeks out its own 
heritage, heritage seems to be expanding and devouring all before it. And yet heritage 
also shrinks and even disappears. Heritage scholarship often counterposes heritage to 
history: the one popular and often made up, the other at least striving for objectivity 
and evidence. We can be skeptical of any such binary opposition, but heritage is rela-
tively more attuned to immediate cultural flows and hegemonic social structures, as 
we have seen in the rise and fall of castles as symbols of masculine militarism in 
twentieth-century Japan. The Western-language (primarily English) heritage scholar-
ship on Japan demonstrates the intimate links of heritage with Japanese history.
日本遺産の西洋言語研究
ピーター・ザロー＊
　過去数十年の間、世界の遺産は劇的に増加し、遺産に関する研
究も増加している。日本の遺産に関する西洋の研究は、アイデン
ティティ、権力、国家、および観光の問題に焦点を当ててきたが、
これらの問題は、「遺産化」のトランスナショナルな性格を踏まえ
て理解する必要がある。本稿は、主に英語を中心とした西洋言語
の研究に基づいて、日本の遺産に関する近年の研究について考察
する。博物館や城を対象とする研究が多い一方で、「無形遺産」や
「負の遺産」も重要である。遺産研究は首尾一貫した研究分野では
ないが、人類学、歴史、地理、美術史、文学研究などの学問分野
の知見をもとに文化的表象の背後にあるものを検討し、権力関係
を明るみに出す。
キーワード：	遺産研究、公共の記憶、観光、アイデンティティ、
日本史
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